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Abstract
This paper provides evidence for the e¤ectiveness of perfor-
mance pay to government workers and how performance pay in-
teracts with demand-side information. In an experiment covering
145 child day-care centres, I implement three separate treatments.
First, I engineer an exogenous change in compensation for child-
care workers from xed wages to performance pay. Second, I
only provide mothers with information without incentivizing the
workers. Third, I combine the rst two treatments. This helps us
identify if performance pay and public information are comple-
ments or substitutes in reducing child malnutrition. I nd that
combining incentives to workers and information to mothers re-
duces weight-for-age malnutrition by 4.2% in 3 months, although
individually the e¤ects are negligible. This complementarity is
shown to be driven by better mother-worker communication and
the mother feeding more caloric food at home. There is also
a sustained long-run positive impact of the combined treatment
after the experiment concluded. (Word Count: 10,646)
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1 Introduction
Performance incentives seem to be very e¤ective in private rms (Lazear,
2000; Bandiera et al., 2007). However, there is little evidence of their
impact in the public sector, especially in public health. Besides, even if
performance incentives could work to boost e¤orts of government health
workers, the gains may be easily undone by informational failures on
the demand-side. In this paper, I test if performance pay to government
health workers is e¤ective in improving health outcomes and how it
interacts with public information.
I look at the specic context of a government childcare worker in In-
dia. She may a¤ect the health of children through two channels: (i) pro-
viding mid-day meals in her day-care center and (ii) informing mothers
on child nutrition. However, Gragnolati et al. (2005) nd that leakage of
meals to nontargeted beneciaries is widespread and childcare workers
do not give guidance to parents on improving nutrition within the family
food budget1. Not surprisingly, mothers seem to lack knowledge on what
to feed especially when the child is undernourished. For instance, six out
of ten mothers in India do not increase uids if their child has diarrhea
(DHS, 2007)2. An estimated 1.27 million children die every year in India
because they are malnourished3.
In an experiment covering 145 child day-care centers and 4101 chil-
dren (aged 3-6 years) in urban slums of Chandigarh, India, I implement
three separate treatments. First, I engineer an exogenous change in com-
pensation for childcare workers from xed wages to performance pay.
Second, I provide mothers with information without incentivizing the
workers. Third, I combine the rst two treatments, where along with
the change in compensation for workers, I supply nutritional informa-
tion to mothers directly. This helps us identify if performance pay and
public information are complements or substitutes in a¤ecting health
outcomes.
The key ndings of the experiment are as follows. Changing com-
pensation from xed wage to performance pay does not change a childs
weight on average in 3 months relative to a control group. Only providing
nutritional information to mothers also does not change weight relative
1 Only 17% of the mothers were counselled by the workers after their child was
weighed in a day-care centre in Punjab (DHS, 2007).
2It is generally understood that being underweight weakens the immune system,
making children more susceptible to disease (Mason et al. 2003; Behrman et al.
2004). The fraction of disease attributable to being underweight is 61% for diarrhea,
57% for malaria, 53% for pneumonia, 45% for measles, and 53% for other infectious
diseases (Fishman et al., 2002).
353% of child deaths are because of malnutrition (Cauleld et al., 2004).
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to control. However, providing incentives to workers and information to
mothers reduces weight-for-age malnutrition by 4.2% in 3 months. This
e¤ect is equivalent to increasing the average income of a household by
51% to achieve the same reduction in malnutrition (via a simple baseline
correlation between child being malnourished and income of family)4.
The weight increase of 71 gms per month relative to a control is also
comparable to the 100 gms per month increase achieved from iron and
deworming implemented in urban slums of Delhi (Bobonis, Miguel and
Sharma, 2004). This points to a complementarity in increasing weight
when incentives and information are supplied together.
Next, I nd some evidence on the mechanisms underlying the change
in weight. In the combined treatment, there appears to be an increase in
calories at home that is signicantly greater than when we only provide
incentives or only information. There are also changes in the nature of
mother-worker interaction. Workers on performance pay start paying
more personalized visits to homes and also talk more about the childs
diet with the mother. In turn, mothers reduce their visits to the day-care
center for meeting the worker.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the e¤ects of
incentive pay on performance in organizations. The literature highlights
potential pitfalls in implementing performance pay. For example, pro-
viding incentives for improvement in only malnourished children may
lead to the worker applying extra e¤ort at the cost of children who
are normal weight. Keeping this in mind, the incentive treatment in
my experiment was designed to disincentivize the worker for a decline
in weight-for-age grade. Similarly, there could be short-term manipu-
lations or plain cheating by workers (Figlio and Winicki, 2005; Jacob
and Levitt, 2003). These concerns are addressed by hiring, training and
monitoring independent enumerators5.
Empirically, most studies implement neither an exogenous change
in compensation schemes nor have a valid control group (Prendergast,
1999; Chiappori and Salanie, 2003). This may be important if there are
other management changes that are taking place at the same time or
if unobservable factors can inuence both outcome and compensation
structure6. My experiment is in the same spirit as Bandiera, Barankay
and Rasul (2007) who have an exogenous change in compensation for
4The magnitude may appear large because the income elasticity in improving
weight is relatively low in my sample (due to the homogeneity of incomes in urban
slums).
5Nevertheless, I check for presence of multi-tasking and gaming in Section 6 of
this paper.
6There may also be an endogenous feedback of performance on the type of com-
pensation.
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managers in a private rm and a valid control group. However, there
exists almost no research on exogenously changing incentive schemes for
workers in a public organization and having a control group7. To my
knowledge, this is the rst such study in the context of public health8.
Performance incentives in social organizations can enhance e¢ ciency and
may lead to positive externalities.
Optimal compensation schemes may be di¤erent in public organi-
zations (Dixit, 2002; Besley and Ghatak, 2005). In the public sector,
high-powered incentive schemes are rarely seen mainly because of a dif-
culty in measuring outcomes, multi-tasking by agents and intrinsic mo-
tivation9. In my specic context, we have a measurable health outcome
(weight-for-age). Moreover, scope for multi-tasking by these childcare
workers is very limited. Therefore, this appears to be a special setting
where many of the common concerns related to performance incentives
in public organizations do not apply.
The paper also contributes to the growing literature of information on
health. The central ndings of this literature are that information does
matter if it is customized to the person targeted and if the information
is specic and intensive (Madajewicz et al., 2007; Dupas, 2005). The
recipe book provided to mothers in the experiment uses these ndings
to list ten recipes which are easy-to-make, economical and use locally
available ingredients. But, it is not known how supplying nutritional
information to the mother would impact child health.
Supply-side interventions have been shown to be less e¤ective if there
is a failure on the demand-side. Banerjee et al. (2010) nd that uptake
of immunization is much higher if small non-nancial incentives are pro-
vided on the demand-side along with an increase in supply10. I nd
evidence to support this view in the context of child malnutrition, where
changing a childcare workers compensation from xed to performance
7An exception is Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) in the eld of public
education in Andhra Pradesh, India.
8In the private sector in the US, medical studies have shown positive e¤ects of
performance pay for nursing homes (Petersen et al., 2006; Norton, 1992).
9It is possible that nancial incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation. My pi-
lot interviews with the workers suggested that their intrinsic motivation had declined
due to a lack of performance pay and there is no private information with the in-
centive provider that can lead to crowding out (Benabou and Tirole, 2003). Also,
nancial incentives may attract di¤erent types of workers. However, the workers
remain the same for the duration of the experiment.
10In a similar vein, Duo et al. (2009) show that reducing pupil-teacher ratio is
more e¤ective when parents are involved in the management of schools. Figlio and
Kenny (2007) nd that merit pay for teachers matters and more so for parents who
are more involved, although their study based on cross-sectional non-experimental
data.
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pay is e¤ective only if information is supplied to mothers simultaneously.
This paper opens the black box of how incentives interact with infor-
mation in public health and illuminates the behavioral mechanisms at
play. Not only is this important for a childs future and her family, it is
relevant for policy makers in shaping compensation schemes for childcare
workers and health policy in general. There may also be a societal gain
from a reduction in malnutrition11. Finally, I also nd that the e¤ect of
the combined treatment is sustainable in the long-run as the signicant
increase in weight is also observed nine months after the experiment was
concluded. This is consistent with the mechanism of mothers changing
their food and health behavior permanently when incentivized workers
pay personalized visits temporarily for a period of three months.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the context
and develops a conceptual framework. Section 3 illustrates the exper-
iment design. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 presents the
specication and main results. Section 6 reports the mechanisms. Sec-
tion 7 checks for robustness of these mechanisms. Section 8 provides
long-term impacts, Section 9 delineates policy implications and Section
10 concludes.
2 Context, treatments and conceptual framework
2.1 Context
In India, the government-run Integrated Child Development Services
(ICDS) program targets close to 35 million children between the age of
3 to 6 years, through over 1.24 million government day-care centers or
Anganwadis. Each Anganwadi is run by an Anganwadi worker who
takes care of children (aged 3-6 years) in a small room from 9am to 1pm
and is on a xed salary of Rs. 2000 ($44.44) per month12. All children
who attend the Anganwadi are provided a meal, the distribution of which
is supervised by the Anganwadi worker. These servings are of cooked
food (e.g. porridge, gruel, etc.) transferred daily from a government
approved agency and then distributed into the individual Anganwadis
in containers. Here, the worker has discretion over its distribution. Un-
der the ICDS Guidelines (2007), they are required to give double of the
standard serving to those who are severely malnourished (600 kcal in-
11Malnutrition has been shown to seriously a¤ect accumulation of human capital.
See, for example, Yamauchi (2008), Alderman et al. (2003) and Martorell (1999).
Adequate nutrition for children is also a human right (UN General Assembly, 1999).
12Assuming an exchange rate of 1$=Rs. 45. Absence among workers is low in my
sample. When enumerators went unannounced in the endline, only 3 workers were
unable to be quizzed.
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stead of 300 kcal), but in practice, this is not veried13. Workers are
also required to hold Monday meetings with the mothers of the children
enrolled in the Anganwadi, give tips on nutrition and health and make
monthly visits to their homes. Additionally, workers are also expected
to promote early childhood education in the Anganwadi, although there
is no o¢ cial syllabus. I focus on the particular case of urban slums in
Chandigarh, a city in North India14. At baseline, 60% of the children
are underweight15.
2.2 Incentive treatment
Weight-for-age grade is the only child malnutrition indicator used by the
Government of India in the ICDS program. Weight-for-age grades are
classied for all children based on the recommendations of IAP (Indian
Association of Paediatricians)16. The workers are familiar with calcu-
lating grades from a standard weight-for-age chart as shown in the Ap-
pendix. For the purpose of the experiment, therefore, change in weight-
for-age grade is used as the criterion for evaluating performance of an
Anganwadi worker17.
In the incentive treatment, the performance bonus promised to each
Anganwadi worker equalled:
Rs:100  n
where n = (# of children whose grade improved # of children whose
13Linden and Shastry (2009) nd evidence to suggest that primary school teachers
in Mumbai manipulate attendance records to favour certain children within a food
transfer programme conditional on attendance.
14Chandigarh had a population of over 9,00,000 in 2001. Spread over an area of
114 sq. km., Chandigarh is the capital of the states of Punjab and Haryana and also
has the special status of a Union Territory. Its sex ratio is 777 females to 1000 males.
The literacy rate is 81.9% compared to the national average of 64.8%. About 12%
of the population is under 6 years of age. (Statistical Abstract of Chandigarh, 2007)
15Approximately 20 are underweight out of an average of 32 children weighed per
Anganwadi.
16From Ramachandran (2006), IAP measures used in Anganwadis are as follows:
Normal: >=80% of the Harvard Median weight-for-age
Mild malnutrition: 70-79%
Moderate malnutrition: 60-69%
Severe malnutrition: 50-59%
Very severe malnutrition: <50%
17Two other malnutrition indicators used by the WHO are low weight-for-height
(wasting) and low height-for-age (stunting). Deaton and Dreze (2008) state that
if a single summary indicator is to be used, weight-for-age would claim special
attention as both wasted and stunted children are likely to fall in the underweight
category. Moreover, in a short-term intervention, weight-for-age is a recommended
indicator as height is not likely to be a¤ected signicantly.
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grade declined).
For example, if 5 children jump from moderate to mildly malnour-
ished and 2 drop from normal to mildly malnourished, she would get Rs.
300 ($6.70). However, the bonus lower bound was 0, so workers would
not be asked to pay if more children experience a grade decline than an
improvement. All workers were given goal cards listing each malnour-
ished childs minimum target weight (in July 2010) above which they
would be given the bonus. For a child of normal weight, a minimum
threshold was provided.
After discussions with the Director, Social Welfare Department, Rs.
100 was nalized as the slope of the compensation scheme because it
was deemed to be su¢ cient to motivate the Anganwadi worker based on
her salary18. The bonus was also in line with feasible policy implications
(based on benet-cost ratios) arising from the experiment as discussed
in Section 819.
2.3 Recipe treatment
For the recipe book treatment, a customized recipe-book based on lo-
cally available ingredients was especially designed and printed in the
vernacular (Hindi). Ten recipes were taken from the Governments pub-
licly available book on Nutritious Recipes for Complementary Feeding
of Young Children. Each recipe was rich in calories and could be easily
made at home within a budget of Rs. 4 for 150 gms20. The booklet
contained information on ingredients, step-by-step instructions and nu-
tritive value (calories, protein, iron and carotene) for each preparation.
Each recipe had multiple boxes at the bottom which mothers were asked
to tick when they prepared that recipe.
It also had information on hygiene and good food habits and high-
lighted food items rich in calories, protein, iron and carotene. According
to Michaelsen et al (2008), energy density in recipes is the most impor-
tant for underweight children, as they have an increased energy need for
catch-up growth. Indeed, Radhakrishna (2006) argues for an increase in
the calorie intake of the bottom 30 per cent of the population in India.
The recipe book was distributed to all mothers who were quizzed in the
recipe or the combined treatment groups. At baseline, only 45% of the
mothers could read but they were given the book even if they could not
18As 20 children were underweight on average in an Anganwadi, improving grades
for all would imply the worker would get an extra months salary (Rs. 2000) af-
ter 3 months. The slope is comparable to Rs. 500 chosen by Muralidharan and
Sundararaman for a teacher whose salary is Rs. 10,000 per month.
19Before the experiment, the probability of grade improvement was unknown and
a pilot would have been too expensive.
20This was calculated by a Nutritionist, Food and Nutrition Board.
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read. However, 75% of the fathers were able to read (according to the
mothers). Moreover, all workers are able to read and write.
2.4 Conceptual framework
This section describes how the weight of a child may be a¤ected by
provision of incentives or information. The weight of a child can be
modeled as follows.
w = w[f(e;R); g(e)]  h(e; r)
Here, f(e; R) is food at home as a function of e¤ort of the worker e
and mother having the Recipe book, R: Food at Anganwadi, g(e) is a
function of e¤ort of the worker only.
I assume that a childs weight may be a¤ected by food provided in
Anganwadi or at home. Food in the Anganwadi depends on workers
e¤ort in so far as the worker feeds more when she is incentivized. Simi-
larly, the worker may put in more e¤ort in informing the mother about
nutrition for her child if she is incentivized. However, the recipe book
can only act on weight by changing the diet at home21. The main ques-
tion that I want to answer is how incentive to a worker interacts with
information to a mother in a¤ecting weight or what is the relationship
between e and r in h(e; r)?
Denote the setup where the worker is incentivized and the mother
has the recipe book as the "combined treatment". Also, designate where
only the worker is incentivized as the "incentive treatment" and where
only the mother has the recipe book as the "recipe treatment".
Assume:
e =

1 if incentive to worker
0 if no incentive to worker
R =

1 if recipe book provided
0 if recipe book not provided
If incentives and information are substitutes in the weight function,
then in reduced form:
h(1; 1)  h(0; 0) < [h(1; 0)  h(0; 0)] + [h(0; 1)  h(0; 0)] (1)
Incentives and information can be substitutes if the combined treat-
ments e¤ect is less than the sum of the individual treatment e¤ects.
21For example, it may do so by changing the composition of food towards more
calories or it can also increase calories by lowering the price per calorie since the
recipe book lists only low-cost caloric recipes.
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This could happen, for instance, (in the extreme case) if the information
that the mother obtains from the recipe book is same as the informa-
tion that she gets from the worker. Here, the impact of the combined
treatment will be no greater than that of the incentive treatment as the
recipe book adds no additional value22.
There can be a complementarity in improving weight if the combined
treatments e¤ect is greater than the sum of the individual treatment ef-
fects. This is possible if there are complementarities between the worker
and mother when incentives are combined with information23. There
can be at least two sources of such a complementarity: rst, if the in-
centivized worker starts reading out recipes to illiterate mothers. The
incentive may make workers visit homes more often and explain recipes
from the book, especially to those mothers who cannot read. Second, if
the incentivized worker uses the recipe book as an anchor point to mon-
itor the mothers. The worker could refer to the specic recipes as a way
of reminding mothers to make economical and nutritious preparations
for her child. The monitoring process may have been made convenient
because of the boxes provided at the bottom of each recipe that mothers
were supposed to tick when they prepared that recipe (although there
was no veriability).
A priori, it is not obvious whether providing incentives and informa-
tion are substitutes or complements in the weight production function
of the child. However, with the three treatments we will have estimates
of all the components of equation (1). Thus, it should be possible to
disentangle the relationship between incentives and information24.
3 Experiment Design
3.1 Matching of Anganwadis
In December 2009, data on malnutrition rates at the Anganwadi-level
was collected from the local Health Department25. Chandigarh has 370
Anganwadis divided into 3 blocks. Each geographical block is further
22Substitutability may also exist if the health production function is concave in
incentives and information.
23Complementarity in weight is also possible with biological complementarity be-
tween food at home and food in Anganwadi in the weight technology. A simple model
in the Appendix shows how mother optimizes food at home in this setting with and
without biological complementarity.
24Conceptually, the impact of the treatments on food at home is analyzed in Section
A3.
25This was information on children aged 0-6 because age-wise disaggregation was
not available. Also, there was no malnutrition data on 10 Anganwadis in a colony in
Block 1.
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divided in clusters and each cluster has an average of 9 Anganwadis. I
chose Anganwadis located only in urban slums for the experiment be-
cause of non-comparability with those located in rural or urban areas26.
The incentive as well as the combined treatment were implemented in
Block 1 as it had the maximum number of Anganwadis in slum ar-
eas. Randomization of the incentive scheme was not possible because
of potential spillover e¤ects among workers. Therefore, incentives were
provided to all workers in the same geographical block to minimize any
informational leakages.
The selection of the incentive-only treatment and the combined treat-
ment from Block 1 was based on selecting a combination of clusters in
each group such that the di¤erence between their malnutrition averages
was minimized. A group of 36 centers was selected from Block 3 to re-
ceive the recipe book treatment and 36 centers were selected from Block
2 to act as control. These groups were selected by an algorithm that
matched the malnutrition averages of centers from Block 2 and 3 to the
average of Block 127. The map in Figure I illustrates the geographical
location and number of Anganwadis in each cluster by treatment and
control (for visual clarity, each square is equivalent to around 5 An-
ganwadis). Table I shows the total number of Anganwadis under each
treatment.
Again, matching was preferred to randomization in recipe book place-
ment because of possible informational spillover e¤ects among mothers
within the same cluster28. This is possible because mothers tend to
live close to each other even if their children may be going to di¤erent
Anganwadis within the same cluster29.
26Ghosh and Shah (2004) reports that the nutritional status of urban slum children
is worst amongst all urban groups and also lower than the rural average. The slum
population in India is 42.6 million, which is 22.6 per cent of the urban population
(Census, 2001).
27Pair-wise comparison of mean t-tests of the Control and Recipe treatments with
the Block 1 average led to acceptance of the null hypothesis of samples being drawn
from populations with the same mean giving p-values of 0.68 and 0.99. See Appendix
for detailed outcomes of the matching process.
28It was not possible to randomize across colonies due to only 12 clusters remaining
in Blocks 2 and 3.
29I also collected data on non-treated Anganwadis in the same cluster where recipe
treatment is implemented to measure spillover e¤ects of information and the analysis
is part of Singh (2011b). I nd evidence of spillovers in information and health
behavior within the same slum area.
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3.2 Implementation of treatments
In April 2010, a team of nine enumerators weighed children on digital
weighing machines and interviewed mothers of these children30. Weights
were recorded before the mid-day meal and it was ensured that children
were not in heavy clothing. The interviews were taken by calling mothers
to the Anganwadi at specied times. Enumerators collected information
on demographics of the household, diet of the child and mother-worker
interaction. A quiz was administered to judge the nutritional knowledge
of all the mothers and the worker31. The multiple-choice quiz for moth-
ers had 5 questions (worth 13 points because of multiple answers per
question) that could be answered by reading the recipe book. The next
4 questions (worth 7 points) were "out-of-book". Mothers in the recipe
treatment were provided with the recipe book after they were quizzed.
Enumerators also noted the previous weights of all children recorded in
the registers of the Anganwadi center.
A window of 3 months was chosen for the experiment because it is
the average time duration between two medical check-ups by the local
Health Department. The duration was veried to be su¢ cient for a
grade improvement to occur by doctors at the local o¢ ce of the Health
Department, Government of India. An ethical concern was that the
workers may feed the children fatty foodsin order to make them gain
weight in the short run. The Director as well as the Supervisors in the
Social Welfare Department were of the view that these foods were quite
expensive and a relatively small incentive of Rs. 100 per malnourished
child over 3 months would never lead workers to purchase extra food
for the children (even if it was good for their health)32. Also, the food
provided by the government is more than su¢ cient for all children in
the Anganwadi and there are also social controls in the form of super-
visors, block o¢ cers, helper in the Anganwadi, parents of the children
and normal weight children.
The second round of the experiment was conducted in July 2010.
The children were weighed again and questionnaires re-administered to
mothers. Cash bonuses were distributed to Anganwadi workers at a
public program held on 31st August 2010.
30Enumerators were trained and supervised by me on the ground throughout the
experiment. The weighing machines used in both rounds were re-used for the same
set of children for accuracy.
31A pilot of the quiz was conducted in out-of-sample Anganwadis in December
2009. The quiz was designed in line with similar quizzes made by the Food and
Nutrition Board for Anganwadi workers. See Figure A.5 in Appendix for an English
translation of the quiz.
32Rs. 100 is equivalent to $2.20 or 5% of the workers monthly wage.
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4 Data description
4.1 Compliance and attrition
Overall, 4101 children were weighed twice during the experiment. For
94% of these children, their mothers were also quizzed two times. Se-
lective taking of the quiz by the smartest mothers may hinder us from
nding the causal e¤ect of the treatments. Therefore, it is necessary
that the compliance rate among mothers is high. Table II illustrates the
compliance and attrition rates. The compliance rate of the mothers is
high due to three reasons: rst, the workers were very cooperative with
the enumerators in calling the mothers who stay in the same slum area.
Second, mothers who came to drop their child to the Anganwadi were
interviewed at the same time. Third, mothers had a chance to win a
prize if they scored the highest marks in the quiz33. This encouraged
both thinking e¤ort and high compliance. No mother refused to be in-
terviewed (even though there were 45 cases where the mother had to
leave before answering the quiz).
The attrition rate on average was 11% in the control. However, at-
trition cannot be attributed to the experiment alone because 71% of
the children who were not weighed again had either left the Anganwadis
and joined primary schools between the two rounds or had migrated else-
where (it was "natural" attrition)34. Moreover, it would be a concern if
the attrition rate was higher in the incentive or combined treatments, as
workers here may be getting only "improved" children weighed. How-
ever, it can be seen from the table that attrition rates are actually lower
in these treatments.
4.2 Summary statistics
Table III shows the summary statistics from the baseline and also the
normalized di¤erences35. Malnutrition is 36% according to the WHO
measure36. A malnutrition rate of over 30% in a sample is regarded
as "very high" (WHO, 1997). In a healthy population, only 2.3% of
children should have a z-score less than -2. If the standard deviation
of the z-score is less than 0.9, it implies that the sample population is
33Along with mothers, the 3 highest scoring Anganwadi workers in both rounds
were also given a cash prize to induce thinking about the questions.
34Moving into primary schools in my sample does not appear to be strongly cor-
related with age.
35All quiz scores and weight-for-age grades were calculated with the help of a
computer program.
36According to the WHO, a child is malnourished if her weight-for-age z-score
< -2. For understanding the di¤erences in outcomes between the two systems, see
Seetharaman et al. (2007).
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very homogenous. On the other hand, a standard deviation exceeding
1.3 suggests inaccurate data due to measurement error (WHO, 1997).
The z-score in this sample has a standard deviation of 0.78 conrming
the homogeneity among weights of children living in slum areas.
The IAP measure shows malnutrition rates close to 60%. Families in
my sample have an average of 3 children and a monthly income of Rs.
3634 ($81). Close to three-quarters of the mothers are housewives, and
38% of the mothers can read and write. Less than 5% of the mothers
have a water lter at home but almost 70% households own a mobile
phone.
We see that normalized di¤erences do not exceed a quarter in the key
variables (only having a fridge and the worker being educated till at least
A-level have normalized di¤erences in excess of 0.25)37. The malnutrition
rates are close to each other because we are focusing only on urban slums
within a city and also because of matching of average malnutrition rates
in the treatments and control (based on Anganwadi-level malnutrition
data obtained from health authorities) before the baseline.
5 Specication and main results
5.1 Specication
The main regression specication for nding the average e¤ect of the
treatments on weight of a child is as follows:
wijt = (post)t+(incentive)j+(recipe)j+(combined)j+(post
incentive)jt + (post  recipe)jt + !(post  combined)jt +Xijt + "ijt
wijt is the weight of a child i in Anganwadi j at time t. The variable
post is a dummy that is 0 for baseline and 1 for endline. The variables
incentive; recipe and combined are 1 if the child is in the treatment
specied and 0 otherwise. Xijt are individual and Anganwadi specic
controls. The error term is clustered by Anganwadi. The variable post
accounts for the natural increase in weight in 3 months, all seasonal
e¤ects on weight, regional shocks to food prices and any management
changes or unobservables that would impact all groups in the same way.
;  and  are the baseline di¤erences between the individual treatments
and the control. ;  and ! give us the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates
for the e¤ect of each of the three treatments. This interpretation rests on
the identication assumption that there are no time varying and block-
specic e¤ects that are correlated with the treatments (common trend
assumption).
37The rule of thumb is that normalized di¤erences should not be greater than 0.25
in absolute value as otherwise, linear regressions tend to be sensitive to specication
(Imbens and Rubin, 2005).
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If ! >  + , it would imply that there is complementarity between
the incentive and the recipe-book treatments and if ! <  + ; it would
signal substitutability (or a possible concave production function).
5.2 Main results
First, I provide evidence for the impact of the treatments on weight,
grade (as measured in the Anganwadi), z-score and the WHO malnour-
ished status of the child. Table IV shows the results using the di¤erence-
in-di¤erences strategy. The rst column shows a 171 gms increase in the
combined treatment over and on top of the 275 gms increase in the con-
trol. The estimate is signicant at the 5% level. There is no e¤ect of
the incentive or the recipe treatments individually on weight gain38.
When we control for factors such as workers nutritional knowledge,
experience and education, the infrastructure in Anganwadi, household
demographics, food expenditure and assets, the estimate of the treat-
ment e¤ect becomes larger (213 gms) and the baseline di¤erence loses
signicance. The combined treatment increases the average grade and
z-score by 0.10, and reduces malnutrition (according to WHO standard)
by 4.2% and there is virtually no e¤ect on grade, z-score and malnutri-
tion in the individual treatments39.
Note, however, that the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate relies on
the common trend assumption which may not hold in practice. If there
are di¤erential pre-treatment trends in (say) the combined treatment
group, we would get a spurious positive coe¢ cient on post  combined:
These trends may exist, for example, if the government assigns better
workers or more infrastructure to the Anganwadi (for e.g. drinking wa-
ter) in the combined treatment. The trends could also exist if mothers
in the combined group start spending more on food or cooking more pro-
ductively before the treatment. These explanations should not be taken
lightly because at baseline, the combined group has a signicantly lower
average weight than the control group. There could also be a natural
reversion to the mean such that children who are more underweight are
also more likely to grow more. To check if this is indeed the case, we
can conduct a simple test where a "Placebo treatment" is applied to the
respective treatment groups on weights measured pre-baseline that were
recorded in Anganwadi registers (and copied by enumerators).
In Table V, a Placebo Post is dened as a dummy variable that takes
value 0 for the weight pre-recorded in the registers (on average 3 months
38All results are robust to clustering the error at the level of a slum cluster.
39These results are robust to excluding outliers (if z-score is more than 4 or less
than -4). See Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix for a Kernel estimation showing the
distribution of changes in weights under treatments and control.
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before the baseline) and 1 in the baseline. We see signicant pre-existing
di¤erences between the "combined treatment" and control that are of
similar magnitude as were seen in the baseline, implying that children
who would eventually get the combined treatment still weighed less 3
months before the treatment. However, we see that the coe¢ cients on
all interaction terms are small and insignicant. The ndings lead us to
believe that there is no reversion to the mean40. Thus, the placebo test
validates the common trends assumption in the main specication.
The core results show that there is a positive impact of the combined
treatment even though there is no e¤ect of either the incentive or the
recipe treatments individually. To check for complementarity between
information and incentives, I test if the sum of the e¤ects under indi-
vidual treatments is equal to the combined treatments e¤ect. This is
rejected (with a p-value of 0.085), implying that the relationship between
incentives and information is that of complements41.
6 Mechanisms
This section focuses on the main mechanisms that could be driving the
change in weight and relates the ndings to extension of conceptual
framework.
6.1 Diet at home
I measure the intake of food at home through questions about composi-
tion and frequency of dietary items to the mother in both rounds. We
see from Table VI that in the incentive treatment, there is an increase in
mothers reported intake of eggs and traditional sweets (Indian desserts)
by their children. As sweets are a rich source of calories and eggs are
high in protein, it makes sense to focus on these foods as protein-energy
decient malnutrition is the most common reason for low weight-for-age
among children42. Secondly, we nd negligible impact of the recipe treat-
ment on intake of these foods at home, although porridge consumption
goes up in the recipe treatment.
Finally, there is a big increase in the intake of eggs and traditional
sweets in the combined treatment. The proportion of children who are
40The results for placebo specication remain robust to excluding previous weights
recorded either within the past two months or more than four months ago.
41Not surprisingly, I also nd a signicant di¤erence between the di¤erence-in-
di¤erences estimates of the combined and the incentive treatments (the p-value of a
t-test of equality between the two coe¢ cents is 0.016).
42Everyday consumption of pulses as well as fruits goes up in the combined treat-
ment. However, there is no change in the consumption of non-vegetarian food (table
not shown).
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provided sweets at least twice a week goes up by 30% in the combined
treatment. This is signicantly di¤erent from the incentive treatment
where the consumption goes up by 18%43.
Conceptually, a worker can talk to the mother and inuence her
feeding to the child. Therefore, the combined treatment can be more
e¤ective than the incentive treatment through two channels. First, sim-
ply having the recipe book available to the mother may increase food at
home. Second, there may be a complementarity between incentive and
information in making the mother-worker communication more e¤ective.
As the recipe book has no e¤ect on weight but we still observe the
combined treatments e¤ect on food at home to be greater than the
incentive treatment, this would imply presence of a complementarity
between incentive and information in changing food at home through
better communication44.
6.2 Communication complementarity
The communication complementarity in the combined treatment may
happen because of two channels. First, the incentivized workers may
be reading the recipes to the illiterate mothers. If incentivized workers
interact more often with illiterate mothers (relative to literate mothers)
and if these mothers in turn change the diet, this sub-channel may be
important45. Second, the incentivized workers use the book as a reference
point to monitor the preparation by mothers. This may have been aided
by the fact that each recipe in the book had been designed to contain
multiple check boxes at the bottom which mothers were asked to tick
when they prepared the recipe (although there was no veriability)46.
We can test the rst channel by looking at the change in workers
visits in the incentive and combined treatments for literate and illiterate
mothers. Table VII reports results on weight, worker visits and sweet
consumption by whether mother can read or not. The workers appear to
visit illiterate mothers no more (in fact, insignicantly less) than literate
mothers in the combined treatment. There is also no signicant di¤er-
ential e¤ect on e¤ort between the workers in the incentive or combined
treatments for illiterate mothers. The robustness check on diet at home
is also consistent because illiterate mothers do not provide more sweets
43The equality test rejects the null with a p-value of 0.0635
44For more details, see Section A3.3 in Appendix.
45The incentivized workers may also increase the credibility of the book by telling
them that they should trust the book and prepare from it, but this e¤ect is not likely
to increase worker visits to the home.
46Anecdotal evidence from interviews with incentive-winning workers revealed that
the book as a reference point was thought to be the most important channel by the
workers in the combined treatment.
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to their children in the combined treatment relative to the incentive
treatment. This suggests that the rst channel is not strong47.
Although there is no direct evidence for the second channel, the recipe
book is likely to have acted as a physical reference during mother-worker
meetings which helped workers better monitor mothers.
6.3 Mother-worker interaction
In this section, I look at how the nature and quantity of mother-worker
interactions change with the three treatments. The mothers question-
naire included questions on the number of worker visits to home and
mother visits to the Anganwadi in the past month. As an additional
check, I also ask the worker to report the number of home visits to
mothers made during the last month for each child enrolled in her An-
ganwadi.
Table VIII illustrates the changes in the quantity of social interaction
between mothers and workers. We nd from column (1) that worker
visits reported by mother seem to decrease in the control group and
increase in all the treatments. This is corroborated by column (4) which
shows the worker visits reported by worker also increase in the incentive
and combined treatments. However, in the recipe treatment, workers
do not report an increase in visits. The other interesting result that
emerges from this table is that the mothers in the incentive and combined
treatments seem to go to the Anganwadi less often when workers visit
more at home. There seems to be a substitution of e¤ort from the
mother to the worker in these two treatments. Column (3) shows that
the decrease in mothers visits almost compensates for the increase in
the workers visits. Home visits by the worker with personal attention to
the mother may be more likely to change dietary intake of the child at
home. These patterns hold even after controlling for all other relevant
variables.
Although the workers seem to increase the home visits, it would be
useful to know if the content of their interaction was altered. In both
rounds, mothers were also asked questions on whether or not the worker
spoke with them about their childs diet, showed them their childs
growth chart or told them consequences of child malnutrition, in the
past three months. Table IX demonstrates that the workers do seem to
advise mothers about the right diet for their children more in the incen-
47There is also a heterogeneity in the recipe treatments e¤ect on weight by
mothers literacy. Literate mothers seem to be better at using the recipe book to
increase the weight of their child relative to illiterate mothers, but the average e¤ect
is small.
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tive and combined treatments even when other controls are included48.
It appears that even in the incentive treatment, workers e¤ort is
a¤ected and mothers also seem to feed more caloric food. However,
the childs weight does not seem to be increasing perhaps because the
calorie intake may not be su¢ cient for weight to increase. The worker
does appear to respond to incentives, but it does not help improve health
outcomes. It implies that the e¤ort of the worker alone is not e¤ective
to change dietary behavior at home.
Randomized evaluations on home visits by para-professionals to im-
prove parenting show that it is very di¢ cult to change parental be-
havior (Almond and Currie, 2010 and Olds et al., 2002). Gragnolati
et al. (2005) remark in the context of an Anganwadi worker in In-
dia: "Although communication for behavior change through the worker
is a crucial weapon in the ght against malnutrition, the information
the worker is conveying to the mothers is not being communicated ef-
fectively enough to positively a¤ect mothersbehavior." However, the
combination of performance pay and information seems to be making
the di¤erence to mothers behavior such that food at home is increasing
(more than the individual treatments) and so is the weight.
6.4 Mothers knowledge
Table X shows the change in mothers theoretical knowledge as mea-
sured by a quiz. The estimates conrm that providing the recipe book
increases the theoretical knowledge even though there is no increase in
weight as shown before49. Also, the incentive to the worker does not
appear to improve mothers knowledge. The estimate is unlikely to be
driven by reversion to the mean as the incentive treatment also starts
with a lower score compared to the control but there is no increase in the
post-treatment. It may be surprising to see no e¤ect of the combined
scheme on the quiz score of the mother. However, there are baseline dif-
ferences between the combined treatment and the control that remain
48One channel through which the weight increase could take place may be increased
attendance of children that is inuenced by workers performance bonus. However, I
do not nd any evidence of an increase in recorded attendance in the incentive or the
combined treatment. The attendance records are not likely to be accurate because
food is distributed to the Anganwadi according to how many children are marked
present. It was observed that children were often marked present if mothers collected
the food of the absentchildren. If incentivized workers tend to reduce over-reporting
of attendance in the second round, we may not be able to nd evidence of an increase
in attendance, even if there was an actual increase.
49The result is in line with Bonvecchio et al. (2007) which looks at the e¤ect of pro-
viding information to mother on uptake of papilla distributed through PROGRESA
and nds signicant e¤ects on mothers knowledge 5 months later.
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signicant even after including other controls. Thus, although it is dif-
cult to compare e¤ects of the incentive and the combined treatments,
it can be seen that the net scores 3 months post-treatment are similar.
Moreover, as the quiz score is a censored variable, most of the increase
in the scores in the recipe treatment comes from the easier questions on
the quiz that tend to be answered correctly in the baseline by moth-
ers in the combined treatment50. This implies that there is little room
for improvement for the mothers in the combined treatment. One con-
cern could be that the combined treatment group is di¤erent because
the mothersgeneral nutritional knowledge was higher than the control
group in the pre-test. However, nutritional knowledge by itself has no
impact on change in weight when it is included as a control. More-
over, the combined treatment is not less e¤ective in increasing weight
when mothers have lower nutritional knowledge than if they have higher
nutritional knowledge at baseline.
6.5 Multi-tasking and gaming
It is possible that the incentivized workers could have tried to focus
on only the malnourished children near their target threshold weight.
However, I do not nd evidence of such multi-tasking by the workers,
possibly because there was a disincentive if the child slipped into the
grade below51.
Moreover, the workers could have engaged in gaming strategies to
increase the measured weight of the children in the very short-run. Ex-
amples of such activities could include lling up children with water or
increasing food supply just before the weighing is done. Care was taken
by the enumerators while weighing children such that they were with-
out shoes and all weights were taken before the mid-day meal had been
served. Also, the workers did not know the exact date when children
would be re-weighed, so the timing was uncertain for the workers, cast-
ing doubts on the possibility of gaming. Enumerators did not observe
any "stu¢ ng" of children before they were weighed52.
The following points also seem to suggest that gaming was not re-
sorted to by the incentivized workers. First, there is no impact on weight
of the incentive treatment. If gaming was the reason for the weight in-
crease in the combined treatment, it should have also been carried out
50When I run a standard regression by taking quiz score from toughest questions
(comprising 6 points), there is no signicant di¤erence between the recipe and the
combined treatments at the 10% level (table not shown).
51See Table A.5 in the Appendix for results.
52Randomly selected children were also weighed by me during my supervisory visits
to each centre.
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in the incentive treatment. Second, the weight increase only happens to
moderately malnourished children and not mildly malnourished children
(see Figure A.2). It is unlikely that lling of water could only be done
for moderately malnourished children. Third, looking at Figure A.2,
we observe that close to 20% of the children gain weight by 1.5 kg in
the combined treatment, whereas the proportion is about 10% for the
incentive treatment. This also points against water-lling as a possible
explanation because that is not likely to lead to such increases in weight.
Finally, when we include the control dummy "Drinking water in Angan-
wadi" in our baseline weight regression, we nd that its coe¢ cient is
actually negative and insignicant which gives further evidence against
gaming.
7 Robustness checks
7.1 Cooking recipes
As quiz score may not be able to capture the increase in a mothers
"practical" information, so questions on frequency of cooking each recipe
from the book in the past three months were posed to mothers in the
recipe and combined treatments in the post-treatment round. We see
from Table XI that mothers in the recipe treatment only prepared special
recipes an average of 8 times in three months. On the other hand,
mothers in the combined treatment prepared more than 5 times as many
recipes that led to a daily increase in calories of 266 over the recipe
treatment assuming no substitution from other foods. Although, we do
not have a pure control group and also not the pre-treatment frequency
for testing the causality of the two treatments, we can infer that mothers
were much more likely to prepare special recipes under the combined
treatment. This result is in line with the result on higher dietary intake
of traditional sweets since 6 out of the 10 recipes in the book could be
classied as traditional sweets. Also, it seems that personalized visits of
the workers as well as their focus on diet managed to make a di¤erence
to the mothers cooking of the recipes.
7.2 Food expenditure
From Table A.1, we see that food expenditure increased in the incentive
treatment, decreased in the recipe treatment and remained unchanged
in the combined treatment. The decrease in food expenditure in the
recipe treatment points towards reducing cost for the mother for a sim-
ilar amount of food provided. The increase in food expenditure in the
incentive treatment may imply that when workers push mothers to feed
better food, the mothers spend more when they do not have access to
20
the book. Finally, mothers in the combined treatment increase the calo-
rie intake at home but this does not seem to come on average from any
additional expenditures.
7.3 Heterogeneity by income
It is intuitive that if the household has a higher income, the incentivized
worker may be able to convince the mother to buy more food than
if the household has a lower income (this is also shown in a simple
model in the Appendix even when the price per calorie goes down). In
Table XII, I nd that the impact of the combined treatment on weight
seems to be higher for richer households (almost twice as large as the
poorer households) but this is imprecisely estimated. In Table XIII, there
appears to be an even stronger di¤erential e¤ect for wealthier households,
but here too, the triple interaction coe¢ cients are not signicant.
Interestingly, we nd a heterogeneity in the impact of the recipe
treatment on weight. The recipe treatment seems to be more e¤ective
for the rich relative to the poor in increasing weight. Moreover, this
seems to be strongly driven by ownership of kitchen assets, implying a
complementarity between food production technology and the availabil-
ity of only a recipe book. This is consistent with the earlier nding of
the heterogeneity in the recipe treatments e¤ect on weight by mothers
literacy.
8 Long-run impact
In order to check if there was a long-run impact of the combined treat-
ments e¤ect after the conclusion of the three-month experiment, I mea-
sured the weights of children in these Anganwadis in April 2011. There
could also have been a lagged e¤ect of providing the recipe book on mal-
nutrition or only performance pay which was not detected after three
months. I nd in Table XIV that the combined treatment has a sus-
tained positive impact of a similar magnitude even nine months after
the incentive scheme was withdrawn53. This is signicant at the 10%
level. However, the recipe and incentive only treatments have almost no
impact in the long-run. This suggests that the nudge towards increasing
the number of home visits by Anganwadi workers to change behavior at
home in the presence of a recipe book is extremely e¤ective even if the
nudge is present temporarily. Moreover, the increase appears to be the
concentrated for the moderately and severely malnourished, who were
the main beneciaries in the short run.
53There were no interviews with mothers in this round.
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9 Policy implications
The combined treatment led to a decline in weight-for-age malnutrition
by 4.2% in 3 months. We can estimate a 15.8% annual reduction in
malnutrition, assuming the probability of improvement in the combined
treatment remains constant throughout the year. Relative risk of death
from infection by malnutrition is 4.24 times as high for moderately mal-
nourished and 2.06 times for mildly malnourished as compared to normal
weight children (Cauleld et al, 2004)54. Pelletier et al. (1995) nd that
of 100 deaths due to malnutrition, 83 are due to mild or moderate mal-
nutrition. The division between the two is 42 from mild and 41 from
moderate (which I have calculated from their relative proportion in my
sample and relative risk of death). This implies that if all moderately
malnourished children were transformed into mildly malnourished, we
would save 21 lives per 100 who would die of malnutrition. The e¤ect of
the combined treatment would imply a reduction of 3.3 deaths per 100 or
saving 34,650 lives every year by implementing the combined treatment,
if all malnourished children are targeted by ICDS.
Overall, 35 Anganwadi workers out of a possible of 73 managed to get
cash bonuses of at least Rs. 100 ($2.20). 25 of these workers belonged
to the combined treatment and 10 to the incentive treatment group.
The average payout to the 25 workers in the combined treatment was
equivalent to a 6.8% increase in their monthly salaries for 3 months. The
10 bonus winning workers in the incentive treatment got an equivalent
of a 5.8% increase in their monthly salaries for 3 months55. However,
if we include those who were eligible but did not get any incentive, the
average payout per worker for the government would be equivalent to
an increase of 4.9% in the salary of a worker in the combined treatment
and 1.5% in the salary of a worker in an incentive-only treatment.
In the combined treatment, the incentive cost is $0.21 per child per
quarter and the recipe book cost is $0.22 per mother per year. As
mothers with more than 1 child may be given only 1 book, we get a
cost of $0.20 per child per year instead of $0.22. For bulk printing, the
cost to the government is likely to be much lower. The total cost works
out to be $1.04 per child per year. The government spends 10 cents per
child currently on their daily mid-day meal (ICDS Guidelines, 2007).
Alternatively, the combined scheme could be thought of as costing the
same as 10 additional meals for a child in a year.
Iron supplementation and deworming drugs have been amongst the
54According to WHO standards, for moderately malnourished children, z-score >=
-3 and < -2. For mildly malnourished, z-score >= -2 and <-1.
55The average payout to those who were awarded was Rs. 408 ($9.06) in the
combined treatment and Rs. 350 ($7.78) in the incentive treatment.
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most e¤ective in reducing malnutrition. Bobonis, Miguel and Sharma
(2004) nd that an increase in weight of 0.5 kg in ve months for 2-6 year
old slum children in Delhi due to iron supplementation and deworming
drugs. This led to participation rates increasing by 5.8%. The higher
wages that resulted from increased pre-school participation rates using
Kingdons (1998) estimates provided a net benet of $29 per child for a
cost of $1.70 per child per year. In the combined treatment, the average
weight gain per month is 71 gms as opposed to 100 gms per month in the
iron and deworming treatment. Assuming a linear relationship between
participation rates and change in weight, the combined treatment should
result in a net benet of $20.60 per child. Moreover, the cost of the
treatment (assuming the incentive payouts happen 4 times a year) is only
$1.04 per child per year, where $0.84 is from annual expected incentive
payouts to the workers and $0.20 from one-time recipe book printing
and distribution56. The benet-cost ratio is close to 20 as compared to
17 for Bobonis, Miguel and Sharma (2004). This is, to my knowledge,
the most cost e¤ective intervention to improve the status of underweight
children in the short-run. Perhaps, most importantly, the benets seem
to last even after the experiment was concluded.
Björkman and Svensson (2009) look at the e¤ect of encouraging
community-based monitoring on child health and nds an increase of
0.14 in the z-score after 1 year. The comparative increase for the com-
bined treatment is much higher at 0.10 after only 3 months.
10 Conclusion
I started by asking what is the impact of performance pay in the pub-
lic health sector and how it interacts with demand-side information in
impacting health? By designing an experiment in the specic context
of a government childcare worker in India and implementing three sep-
arate treatments, we found that providing performance pay alone may
not be e¤ective in improving health outcomes. The worker does respond
to incentives, but it does not help improve child health. However, when
performance pay is combined with practical and specic information to
the demand-side, there is a signicant increase in weight and reduction
in child malnutrition. This complementarity in incentives and informa-
tion is consistent with better communication between the worker and
the mother, wherein the incentivized worker makes e¤orts to monitor
mothers through personalized home visits. This seems to be much more
56The cost for our treatment is much lower than the World Bank (2006) gures
for a nutrition education program of $2.50 per person per year. The simple reason is
that we are exploiting the infrastructure of Anganwadis that is already in place with
performance-based incentives.
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e¤ective in increasing caloric and protein-rich food at home in the com-
bined treatment relative to the incentive treatment.
Use of a recipe book as a monitoring device by workers is consistent
with all the results we nd. Therefore, by uncovering behavioral mech-
anisms underlying the change in weight, we shed light on pathways of
reducing child malnutrition in urban slums. The result points towards
the possibilities for future research to have interventions that target both
the supply-side and demand-side as well as incorporating insights from
behavioral economics into designing interventions that try to increase
complementarity between the two.
Child malnutrition has often been called the most di¢ cult challenge
facing development economists, but there appears to be a glimmer of
hope if performance pay to workers is combined with specic information
to mothers.
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11 Tables and Figures
Yes No
Yes 35 from Block 1 36 from Block 3
No 38 from Block 1 36 from Block 2
Recipe
Book
              Incentive
Table I: Total Anganwadis under each
Treatment and Block
Incentive Recipe Combined Control Total
children weighed 1188 1145 1081 1231 4645
children whose mothers quizzed 1178 1089 963 1207 4437
% children whose mothers quizzed 99 95 89 98 96
children weighed 1061 964 985 1091 4101
children whose mothers quizzed 1008 908 869 1053 3838
% children whose mothers quizzed 95 94 88 97 94
89 84 91 89 88
86 83 90 87 86
% children weighed again
% mothers quizzed again
Table II: Compliance and attrition rates
Round 1
Round 2
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VARIABLES Incentive Recipe Combined Control Incentive Recipe Combined
Weight (in kgs) 13.12 13.21 12.97 13.29 -0.07 -0.03 -0.12
(1.79) (1.84) (1.81) (1.86)
Grade (according to IAP) 4.17 4.17 4.04 4.21 -0.04 -0.04 -0.15
(0.79) (0.78) (0.82) (0.78)
z-score (according to WHO, 2007) -1.66 -1.7 -1.81 -1.66 0.00 -0.04 -0.14
(0.8) (0.76) 0.76 (0.78)
Malnutrition (according to WHO, 2007) .32 .36 .43 .33 -0.02 0.04 0.15
(.47) (.48) (.5) (.47)
Malnutrition (according to IAP) .61 .62 .67 .59 0.03 0.04 0.12
(.49) (.49)  (.47) (.49)
Quiz score (out of 20)  11.92 12.00  13.58   12.55 -0.16 -0.14 0.25
(3.04) (3.25) (2.75)  (2.55)
Age of child (in years) 4.16  4.28   4.28 4.27 -0.10 0.01 0.01
(.79) (.86) (.84) (.83)
Age of mother (in years) 28.80 28.39 28.31  28.53 0.04 -0.02 -0.03
(4.66) (4.73) (4.57) (4.33)
Number of children 2.87 3.02 3.00  2.76 0.06 0.15 0.13
(1.24)  (1.30) (1.33)  (1.25)
Income (in Rs.)  3802  3384 3513 3796 0.00 -0.16 -0.12
( 1770) (1475) (1306)  (1770)
Housewife .79 .71 .78 .78 0.02 -0.12 0.00
(.41) (.45) (.40) (.41)
Fridge .30 .24*  .30 .45 -0.22 -0.31 -0.23
(.46) (.43)  (.46) (.50)
Mobile .72 .65 .71 .69 0.05 -0.06 0.03
(.45)  (.47) (.45) (.46)
Water filter .03  .03 .02 .09 -0.18 -0.18 -0.21
(.18) (.18) (.13) (.28)
Literate mother (can read and write)  .41 .32 .36 .42 -0.01 -0.15 -0.09
(.49) ( .47) (.48) (.49)
Educated worker (till at least A-level) .48  .54 .43* .65 -0.25 -0.16 -0.32
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.48)
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Grades calculated according to IAP (Indian Association of Paediatricians) that is
used in Anganwadis have been re-ordered from severely malnourished (1) to Normal (5). Normalized differences are
calculated using the formula as in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a scale-free measure of the difference in distributions.
A rule of thumb is that when normalized difference exceeds 0.25 in absolute value, linear regression methods tend to be
sensitive to the specification (Imbens and Rubin (2007)). * indicate a normalized difference exceeding 0.25.
Normalized Differences
Table III: Summary statistics from the baseline
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Table IV: Main results on weight, grade, z-score and malnourished status
VARIABLES Weight Grade z-score Malnourished Weight Grade z-score Malnourished
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post 0.275*** -0.051* -0.048** 0.027* 0.264*** -0.047* -0.057** 0.019
(0.049) (0.027) (0.024) (0.015) (0.051) (0.028) (0.025) (0.016)
Incentive -0.135 -0.040 0.008 -0.011 -0.046 0.018 0.089 -0.034
(0.112) (0.049) (0.052) (0.029) (0.141) (0.050) (0.055) (0.032)
Recipe -0.012 -0.010 -0.013 0.017 -0.009 0.084* 0.073 -0.037
(0.112) (0.046) (0.048) (0.028) (0.120) (0.045) (0.049) (0.032)
Combined -0.300** -0.179*** -0.148*** 0.097*** -0.208 -0.046 -0.002 0.031
(0.127) (0.053) (0.053) (0.032) (0.142) (0.057) (0.058) (0.035)
Post*Incentive -0.004 0.025 0.001 0.011 0.003 0.018 0.002 0.013
(0.065) (0.037) (0.031) (0.021) (0.071) (0.040) (0.034) (0.023)
Post*Recipe -0.017 0.009 -0.003 -0.014 0.006 0.002 0.010 -0.001
(0.073) (0.042) (0.035) (0.023) (0.078) (0.046) (0.038) (0.027)
Post*Combined 0.171** 0.103** 0.080** -0.046* 0.213** 0.105** 0.100** -0.042*
(0.082) (0.045) (0.039) (0.024) (0.087) (0.048) (0.041) (0.025)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 13.268*** 4.203*** -1.674*** 0.338*** 11.940*** 3.834*** -2.095*** 0.535***
(0.082) (0.032) (0.032) (0.020) (0.481) (0.157) (0.162) (0.094)
Observations 8202 8202 8202 8202 6318 6318 6318 6318
R-squared 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.026 0.028 0.037 0.024
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Grades have been ordered from very severely malnourished (1) to
normal (5) according to thresholds used in Anganwadis and also for the bonus incentive in this experiment. Weight-for-age z-score for each child is
calculated by the following formula from WHO Reference (2007):
(observed weight –median weight-for-age from reference population)/(Std. deviation of weight-for-age from reference population).
Malnourished status is a dummy which takes value 1 if child is malnourished according to WHO classification (if z-score < -2). Other controls
include: Age of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion non-kitchen, Household Income, Food expenditure, No. of family members who are children,
adult members, and the following dummy variables: Mother housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi,
Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High quiz score worker (if quiz score is higher than median in the baseline),
High quiz score mother, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Literate mother (if the mother
can read and write), Literate father, Educated worker (at least till A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life.
Proportion kitchen means proportion of kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker.
Non-kitchen assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table V: Placebo test for weight, grade, z-score and malnourished status
VARIABLES Weight Grade z-score Malnourished Weight Grade z-score Malnourished
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Placebo Post 0.291*** -0.018 -0.015 0.020 0.279*** -0.018 -0.018 0.023
(0.084) (0.040) (0.039) (0.026) (0.096) (0.046) (0.045) (0.029)
Incentive -0.186 0.024 0.007 -0.014 -0.061 0.106* 0.100* -0.053
(0.122) (0.064) (0.062) (0.036) (0.142) (0.061) (0.057) (0.034)
Recipe -0.137 -0.019 -0.045 0.018 -0.154 0.059 0.038 -0.023
(0.138) (0.070) (0.071) (0.040) (0.147) (0.066) (0.066) (0.040)
Combined -0.279* -0.145** -0.143** 0.081* -0.223 -0.037 -0.014 0.031
(0.149) (0.071) (0.071) (0.041) (0.170) (0.076) (0.075) (0.043)
Placebo Post*Incentive 0.051 -0.065 0.001 0.003 0.064 -0.067 0.008 0.006
(0.107) (0.054) (0.054) (0.034) (0.121) (0.061) (0.062) (0.037)
Placebo Post*Recipe 0.125 0.009 0.032 -0.001 0.138 0.012 0.032 -0.009
(0.108) (0.054) (0.056) (0.039) (0.123) (0.062) (0.064) (0.045)
Placebo Post*Combined -0.021 -0.035 -0.005 0.017 0.012 -0.017 0.008 0.004
(0.107) (0.054) (0.052) (0.036) (0.122) (0.060) (0.060) (0.039)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 12.976*** 4.221*** -1.658*** 0.318*** 11.658*** 3.845*** -2.129*** 0.519***
(0.098) (0.052) (0.049) (0.028) (0.504) (0.183) (0.183) (0.115)
Observations 8106 8106 8106 8106 6336 6336 6336 6336
R-squared 0.013 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.031 0.031 0.042 0.027
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Placebo Post is a dummy that takes value 1 at the Baseline and 0
for the weight recorded in the registers before the baseline (on average 3 months before). Grade, weight-for-age z-score and malnourished are
defined as before. Other controls include: Age of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion non-kitchen, No. of family members who are children,
adult members, and the following dummy variables: Mother housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in
Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High quiz score worker (if quiz score is higher than median
in the baseline), High quiz score mother, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Literate
mother (if the mother can read and write), Literate father, Educated worker (at least till A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is
very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen means proportion of kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking
gas and pressure cooker. Non-kitchen assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table VI: Diet (at least twice a week)
VARIABLES Green Veg Egg Pulses Sweet Green Veg Egg Pulses Sweet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post -0.074 -0.130*** 0.004 -0.070*** -0.084 -0.142*** -0.013 -0.080***
(0.054) (0.030) (0.046) (0.026) (0.056) (0.033) (0.049) (0.029)
Incentive 0.075 -0.050 0.043 -0.037 0.052 -0.088** 0.030 -0.045
(0.051) (0.034) (0.048) (0.029) (0.049) (0.040) (0.046) (0.034)
Recipe 0.042 0.075* 0.069 0.043 0.036 0.044 0.046 0.051
(0.049) (0.041) (0.044) (0.032) (0.048) (0.048) (0.043) (0.038)
Combined 0.114** -0.052 0.082* -0.066** 0.106** -0.091** 0.076* -0.067*
(0.053) (0.037) (0.049) (0.028) (0.051) (0.042) (0.045) (0.036)
Post*Incentive 0.074 0.197*** 0.076 0.186*** 0.067 0.185*** 0.087 0.177***
(0.062) (0.048) (0.052) (0.048) (0.066) (0.052) (0.058) (0.050)
Post*Recipe 0.054 0.066 0.037 0.033 0.045 0.071 0.050 0.054
(0.069) (0.041) (0.054) (0.039) (0.073) (0.045) (0.059) (0.044)
Post*Combined 0.089 0.292*** 0.077 0.292*** 0.092 0.303*** 0.079 0.307***
(0.063) (0.065) (0.052) (0.060) (0.065) (0.066) (0.053) (0.062)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.750*** 0.228*** 0.785*** 0.124*** 0.566*** 0.394*** 0.660*** 0.010
(0.046) (0.026) (0.041) (0.025) (0.100) (0.106) (0.100) (0.058)
Observations 7766 7766 7766 7766 6539 6539 6539 6539
R-squared 0.023 0.029 0.024 0.042 0.052 0.052 0.061 0.076
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the Anganwadi level in parentheses. Green Veg, Egg, Pulses and Sweet are dummy variables
equal to one when their intake by the child is on average at least twice a week and 0 otherwise based on mother’s recall data from the past
three months. Other controls include: Age of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion non-kitchen, Household Income, Food expenditure,
No. of family members who are children, adult members, and the following dummy variables: Mother housewife, Electricity in
Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High
quiz score worker (if quiz score is higher than median in the baseline), High quiz score mother, High experienced worker (if experience of
the worker is more than the median experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read and write), Literate father, Educated worker (at
least till A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen means proportion of kitchen
assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker. Non-kitchen assets are mobile, television,
scooter, radio and a flush toilet.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table VII: Testing the Channel of Complementarity by Mother’s literacy
VARIABLES Weight Worker visit
Reported by
Mother
Worker visit
Reported by
Worker
Sweet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 0.193** -2.377*** -1.741* 0.078
(0.074) (0.653) (0.898) (0.114)
Post*Incentive 0.116 3.860*** 3.987*** -0.361**
(0.081) (0.806) (1.415) (0.147)
Post*Recipe 0.159 3.270*** 1.902* -0.009
(0.117) (0.742) (0.974) (0.146)
Post*Combined 0.282*** 4.249*** 4.576*** -0.665***
(0.101) (0.825) (1.516) (0.163)
Post*Illiterate*Incentive -0.174 0.001 -0.548 -0.109
(0.109) (0.687) (0.978) (0.143)
Post*Illiterate*Recipe -0.254* -1.213* -0.589 -0.066
(0.131) (0.700) (0.794) (0.136)
Post*Illiterate*Combined -0.093 -0.403 0.718 -0.185
(0.106) (0.689) (1.104) (0.152)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 11.861*** 7.115*** 2.381 3.920***
(0.469) (1.274) (1.822) (0.177)
Observations 6520 6519 6369 6520
R-squared 0.025 0.124 0.348 0.092
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the Anganwadi level in parentheses. Illiterate is a
dummy for mother who cannot read. Other controls include: Illiterate, Post*Illiterate, Incentive,
Recipe, Combined, Illiterate*Incentive, Illiterate*Recipe, Illiterate*Combined, Age of mother,
No. of family members who are children, adult members, and the following dummy variables:
Mother housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi,
Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High experienced
worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Educated worker (at
least till A-level), ownership of kitchen and non-kitchen assets, income, food expenditure,
Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table VIII: Social Interaction between Mother and Worker
VARIABLES Worker visits
Reported by
Mother
Mother visits
Reported by
Mother
Total visits
Reported by
Mother
Worker visits
Reported by
Worker
Worker Visits
Reported by
Mother
Mother visits
Reported by
Mother
Total visits
Reported by
Mother
Worker visits
Reported by
Worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post -2.005*** -1.138* -3.143*** -1.367** -1.949*** -0.730 -2.680*** -1.534**
(0.474) (0.619) (1.022) (0.618) (0.478) (0.612) (1.000) (0.695)
Incentive -0.922 6.044*** 5.127*** 4.820*** -0.962 5.773*** 4.814*** 3.825***
(0.580) (1.040) (1.392) (1.258) (0.614) (1.066) (1.447) (1.179)
Recipe -2.107*** 2.910*** 0.799 -1.748** -2.041*** 3.165*** 1.118 -1.699**
(0.560) (1.051) (1.401) (0.728) (0.560) (1.069) (1.434) (0.775)
Combined -2.206*** 5.170*** 2.964* 0.515 -2.489*** 5.432*** 2.943* -0.517
(0.559) (1.267) (1.600) (0.958) (0.595) (1.297) (1.653) (1.169)
Post*Incentive 3.963*** -2.215** 1.745 2.337** 3.728*** -2.176** 1.552 3.254***
(0.609) (1.053) (1.438) (1.071) (0.636) (1.083) (1.462) (1.164)
Post*Recipe 2.459*** 0.243 2.694* 0.892 2.493*** 0.246 2.734* 1.306
(0.545) (1.129) (1.495) (0.714) (0.574) (1.132) (1.496) (0.815)
Post*Combined 3.871*** -1.929 1.942 4.263*** 3.807*** -1.949 1.858 5.227***
(0.634) (1.433) (1.628) (1.375) (0.637) (1.424) (1.628) (1.457)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 5.565*** 7.423*** 12.989*** 5.733*** 6.437*** 4.807 11.240*** 2.486
(0.520) (0.673) (1.135) (0.590) (1.163) (2.979) (3.333) (1.880)
Observations 7764 7762 7761 9350 6537 6539 6538 6223
R-squared 0.098 0.087 0.073 0.211 0.122 0.112 0.092 0.347
Notes: Number of Worker Visits and Mother Visits in the previous month are reported by the mother in both rounds. Worker visits in the previous
month are reported by worker for each child in both rounds. Robust standard errors clustered at the Anganwadi level in parentheses. Other controls
include: Age of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion non-kitchen, Household Income, Food expenditure, No. of family members who are children,
adult members, and the following dummy variables: Mother housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi,
Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High quiz score worker (if quiz score is higher than median in the baseline),
High quiz score mother, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Literate mother (if the mother
can read and write), Literate father, Educated worker (at least till A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life.
Proportion kitchen means proportion of kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker.
Non-kitchen assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
.
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Table IX: Content of Interaction between Worker and Mother
VARIABLES Talked
about
Diet
Showed
Growth
Chart
Talked about
Consequences of
Malnutrition
Talked
about
Diet
Showed
Growth
Chart
Talked about
Consequences of
Malnutrition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post -0.014 -0.156*** -0.066 -0.010 -0.127** -0.079
(0.018) (0.053) (0.049) (0.015) (0.051) (0.054)
Incentive -0.048** 0.043 -0.149*** -0.044* 0.114** -0.108*
(0.023) (0.040) (0.053) (0.025) (0.051) (0.060)
Recipe -0.035* -0.103** -0.062 -0.035* -0.040 -0.051
(0.021) (0.049) (0.049) (0.020) (0.056) (0.056)
Combined -0.073* 0.018 0.002 -0.077** 0.101** 0.016
(0.037) (0.049) (0.055) (0.035) (0.051) (0.056)
Post*Incentive 0.074** -0.053 0.048 0.061** -0.088 0.061
(0.029) (0.086) (0.086) (0.030) (0.087) (0.092)
Post*Recipe 0.014 0.165** 0.092 0.021 0.124 0.101
(0.038) (0.075) (0.070) (0.030) (0.075) (0.074)
Post*Combined 0.116*** 0.057 -0.036 0.101*** 0.032 -0.029
(0.039) (0.070) (0.068) (0.036) (0.069) (0.074)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.963*** 0.840*** 0.840*** 0.962*** 0.875*** 1.041***
(0.012) (0.034) (0.036) (0.039) (0.104) (0.100)
Observations 7676 7672 7675 6525 6521 6524
R-squared 0.017 0.032 0.020 0.047 0.089 0.087
Notes: Dependent Variables are all dummy variables that take value 1 if the worker talked to the mother in
the past 3 months on these topics as reported by the mother. Robust standard errors clustered at the
Anganwadi level in parentheses. Other controls include: Age of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion non-
kitchen, Household Income, Food expenditure, No. of family members who are children, adult members,
and the following dummy variables: Mother housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi,
Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High
quiz score worker (if quiz score is higher than median in the baseline), High quiz score mother, High
experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Literate mother (if the
mother can read and write), Literate father, Educated worker (at least till A-level), Worker is very satisfied
with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen means proportion of kitchen assets owned.
Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker. Non-kitchen assets are
mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table X: Quiz score and its components
VARIABLES Quiz
Score
Recipe
Score
Non-recipe
Score
Quiz
Score
Recipe
Score
Non-recipe
Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.076 -0.180 0.256** 0.115 -0.172 0.287**
(0.289) (0.200) (0.129) (0.288) (0.202) (0.130)
Incentive -0.604* -0.642** 0.038 -0.297 -0.381 0.084
(0.350) (0.260) (0.128) (0.385) (0.305) (0.134)
Recipe -0.473 -0.490* 0.017 -0.574 -0.580* 0.006
(0.363) (0.273) (0.142) (0.406) (0.303) (0.155)
Combined 1.030*** 0.826*** 0.204* 0.956*** 0.772*** 0.184
(0.349) (0.281) (0.123) (0.349) (0.270) (0.129)
Post*Incentive -0.428 -0.411 -0.017 -0.495 -0.415 -0.080
(0.547) (0.423) (0.169) (0.586) (0.459) (0.177)
Post*Recipe 1.312*** 1.118*** 0.194 1.303*** 1.178*** 0.124
(0.395) (0.288) (0.163) (0.410) (0.299) (0.166)
Post*Combined 0.273 0.223 0.050 0.366 0.319 0.047
(0.386) (0.273) (0.187) (0.396) (0.282) (0.186)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant 12.521*** 7.497*** 5.025*** 13.603*** 8.359*** 5.244***
(0.208) (0.142) (0.096) (0.908) (0.711) (0.315)
Observations 7676 7676 7676 6628 6628 6628
R-squared 0.075 0.091 0.025 0.091 0.113 0.046
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Quiz score is out of 20 where
recipe and non-recipe scores are out of 13 and 7 respectively. Other controls include: Age of mother,
Proportion kitchen, Proportion non-kitchen, Household Income, Food expenditure, No. of family members
who are children, adult members, and the following dummy variables: Mother housewife, Electricity in
Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu,
Grandmother at home, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median
experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read and write), Literate father, Educated worker (at least till
A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen means
proportion of kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and
pressure cooker. Non-kitchen assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table XI: Calories from recipes cooked using book
VARIABLES Total calories
from recipes
Number of times
recipes cooked
(1) (2)
Combined 266.183*** 44.238***
(34.416) (5.520)
Constant 44.798*** 8.178***
(7.519) (1.398)
Observations 1960 1960
R-squared 0.377 0.393
Note: Results are from a cross-sectional regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the Anganwadi level in parentheses.
Mothers in the recipe and combined treatment were asked how many times they cooked each of the ten recipes from the recipe
book in the past three months between baseline and post-treatment round. The recipe book had boxes underneath each recipe that
could be ticked by the mother every time she prepared a recipe. Calories have been calculated assuming 150 gms of the recipe
was given to the child and total calories have been divided by 90 to get average calories from recipes per day. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table XII: Heterogeneous impact of treatments on weight by income
VARIABLES Weight Grade z-score Malnourished
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 0.298*** -0.002 -0.043 0.010
(0.067) (0.034) (0.033) (0.016)
Post*Incentive 0.011 -0.020 0.021 0.026
(0.080) (0.045) (0.040) (0.026)
Post*Recipe -0.064 -0.060 -0.019 0.010
(0.097) (0.056) (0.047) (0.029)
Post*Combined 0.132 0.037 0.069 -0.028
(0.116) (0.064) (0.055) (0.032)
Post*Rich*Incentive -0.085 0.041 -0.067 -0.008
(0.111) (0.065) (0.053) (0.041)
Post*Rich*Recipe 0.140 0.114* 0.055 -0.023
(0.126) (0.068) (0.061) (0.049)
Post*Rich*Combined 0.117 0.111 0.041 -0.021
(0.139) (0.080) (0.068) (0.048)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 12.129*** 3.939*** -1.953*** 0.481***
(0.502) (0.161) (0.172) (0.097)
Observations 6376 6376 6376 6376
R-squared 0.027 0.026 0.036 0.024
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the Anganwadi level in parentheses. Rich is a
dummy for a household which has a greater than the median income at baseline (Rs. 3000).
Other controls include: Rich, Post*Rich, Incentive, Recipe, Combined, Rich*Incentive,
Rich*Recipe, Rich*Combined, Age of mother, No. of family members who are children,
adult members, and the following dummy variables: Mother housewife, Electricity in
Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi,
Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High quiz score worker (if quiz score is higher than
median in the baseline), High quiz score mother, High experienced worker (if experience of
the worker is more than the median experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read and
write), Literate father, Educated worker (at least till A-level), Worker is very satisfied with
work, Worker is very satisfied with life. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table XIII: Heterogeneous impact of treatments on weight by assets
VARIABLES Weight Grade z-score Malnourished
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 0.354*** -0.012 -0.002 0.008
(0.082) (0.039) (0.041) (0.022)
Post*Incentive -0.035 0.007 -0.020 0.021
(0.106) (0.050) (0.055) (0.033)
Post*Recipe -0.158 -0.094 -0.075 0.016
(0.113) (0.066) (0.054) (0.037)
Post*Combined 0.064 0.002 0.031 -0.028
(0.154) (0.085) (0.074) (0.041)
Post*Highpropkitchen*Incentive 0.021 -0.001 0.018 -0.005
(0.120) (0.054) (0.062) (0.038)
Post*Highpropkitchen*Recipe 0.272* 0.170** 0.134** -0.029
(0.139) (0.072) (0.066) (0.043)
Post*Highpropkitchen*Combined 0.188 0.145 0.086 -0.020
(0.162) (0.088) (0.078) (0.040)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 12.054*** 3.928*** -1.975*** 0.458***
(0.518) (0.157) (0.165) (0.098)
Observations 6398 6398 6398 6398
R-squared 0.026 0.025 0.033 0.022
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the Anganwadi level in parentheses. Highpropkitchen
means 3 or more of the following kitchen assets are owned: fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking
gas and pressure cooker. Other controls include: Highpropkitchen, Post*Highpropkitchen,
Incentive, Recipe, Combined, Highpropkitchen*Incentive, Highpropkitchen*Recipe,
Highpropkitchen*Combined, Age of mother, No. of family members who are children, adult
members, and the following dummy variables: Mother housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in
Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu,
Grandmother at home, High quiz score worker (if quiz score is higher than median in the baseline),
High quiz score mother, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the
median experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read and write), Literate father, Educated
worker (at least till A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table XIV: Long-run impact on weight, grade, z-score and
malnourished status
VARIABLES Weight Grade z-score Malnourished
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 1.680*** 0.085*** 0.061** -0.045**
(0.067) (0.025) (0.029) (0.017)
Incentive -0.176* -0.043 0.000 -0.006
(0.105) (0.047) (0.051) (0.028)
Recipe -0.087 -0.041 -0.038 0.030
(0.101) (0.044) (0.046) (0.027)
Combined -0.324*** -0.174*** -0.151*** 0.101***
(0.123) (0.052) (0.054) (0.032)
Post*Incentive 0.006 -0.030 -0.002 0.041*
(0.089) (0.038) (0.038) (0.022)
Post*Recipe -0.175 -0.051 -0.059 0.014
(0.115) (0.049) (0.047) (0.030)
Post*Combined 0.183* 0.725 0.087* -0.057*
(0.107) (0.049) (0.046) (0.030)
Constant 13.292*** 4.210*** -1.662*** 0.323***
(0.072) (0.029) (0.030) (0.019)
Observations 8439 8420 8420 8420
R-squared 0.162 0.838 0.007 0.007
Notes: Post is a dummy equal to 1 for the long-run survey in April, 2011 and 0 for baseline in
April, 2010. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Grades
have been ordered from very severely malnourished (1) to normal (5) according to thresholds
used in Anganwadis and also for the bonus incentive in this experiment. Weight-for-age z-
score for each child is calculated by the following formula from WHO Reference (2007):
(observed weight – median weight-for-age from reference population)/(Std. deviation of
weight-for-age from reference population).
Malnourished status is a dummy which takes value 1 if child is malnourished according to
WHO classification (if z-score < -2). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure I: Map showing the location and number of Anganwadis in each
cluster by treatment and control
Appendix
A1 A simple model
The following section shows one possible channel (price per calorie)
through which the recipe and incentive treatments may be a¤ecting
weight of the child.
A childs weight can be a¤ected by calories provided in Anganwadi
or at home. It makes no di¤erence to the weight if the child gets calories
at home or in the Anganwadi. Denoting food (calories) at home as f1,
food in Anganwadi as f2, and the productivity of turning calories into
weight as ; the weight of a child is:
w = (f1 + f2)
The e¤ort of the worker e can be either high, eh or low, el: Worker
may exert either high or low e¤ort in both feeding children at Anganwadi
and informing the mother. She exerts high e¤ort when she is incentivized
and low when she is not.
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Assume:
e =

1 if e = eh
0 if e = el
Calories provided in Anganwadi are greater if worker puts in high
e¤ort. On the other hand, calories at home are provided by the mother
who has limited information on the price per calorie of food items. She
can reduce the price per calorie if she is more informed. Her ignorance
I may depend on the workers e¤ort in informing her about low-cost
nutritious recipes and her access to the recipe book, R where:
R =

1 if recipe book is provided
0 if recipe book is not provided
The mothers utility function is Cobb-Douglas in weight of her child,
w and other non-food household items, x :
u = xw
When I only depends onR, the maximization problem for the mother
is:
max
x;f1
u = x(f1 + f2)
   1(I(R)f1 + pxx m)
Taking rst-order conditions and solving, we get:
f1 =
1
 + 
(
m
I(R)
  f2)
Substituting value of f1 in w:
w = (
1
 + 
(
m
I(R)
  f2) + f2)
When I depends on R and e, the maximization problem for the
mother is:
max
x;f1
u = x(f1 + f2)
   1(I(e;R)f1 + pxx m)
Taking rst-order conditions and solving, we get:
f1 =
1
 + 
[
m
I(e;R)
  f2
1 + f2
]
The di¤erence in the impact of the combined treatment and the in-
centive treatment is:
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wci = w(1; 1)  w(1; 0) =  m
 + 
[
1
I(1; 1)
  1
I(1; 0)
]
The recipe book treatment e¤ect is:
wr = w(0; 1)  w(0; 0) =  m
 + 
[
1
I(0; 1)
  1
I(0; 0)
]
For testing complementarity, the e¤ect of the combined treatment
should be greater than the sum of the incentive and recipe book treat-
ment:
wci  wr =  m
 + 
[
1
I(1; 1)
  1
I(1; 0)
  1
I(0; 1)
+
1
I(0; 0)
]
Complementarity exists if:
1
I(1; 1)
  1
I(1; 0)
  1
I(0; 1)
+
1
I(0; 0)
> 0
A2 Biological complementarity and social interac-
tion
Now consider the most general case when I is a function of e and R ,
and there is biological complementarity.
Assume:
w = f1 + f2 + f1f2
The maximization problem for the mother is:
max
x;f1
u = x(f1 + f2 + f1f2)
   1(I(e; R)f1 + pxx m)
Taking rst-order conditions and solving, we get:
f1 =
1
 + 
[
m
I(e;R)
  f2
1 + f2
]
The di¤erence between the e¤ect of combined and incentive treat-
ments:
wci = 
m
 + 
(1 + f2(1))[
1
I(1; 1)
  1
I(1; 0)
]
The recipe book treatment:
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wr = 
m
 + 
(1 + f2(0))[
1
I(0; 1)
  1
I(0; 0)
]
The complementarity e¤ect is as follows:
wci  wr =  m+f[ 1I(1;1)   1I(1;0)   1I(0;1) + 1I(0;0) ] + [f2(1)( 1I(1;1)  
1
I(1;0)
)  f2(0)( 1I(0;1)   1I(0;0))]g
Complementarity may exist because of two channels as embodied by
the two composite terms in square brackets:
The rst term is due to the social interaction alone and the second
is due to the biological complementarity (if  > 0).
Assume:
I = 1  1e  2R  3eR:
Now, as before:
wci = 
m
 + 
(1 + f2(1))[
1
1  1   2   3
  1
1  1
]
wr = 
m
 + 
(1 + f2(0))[
1
1  2
  1]
The complementarity e¤ect is:
wci wr =  m+f[ 11 1 2 3 
1
1 1 
1
1 2+1]+[f2(1)(
1
1 1 2 3 
1
1 1 )  f2(0)(
1
1 2   1)]g
Case A: 1 = 0
Now, if a signicant di¤erence exists between the combined and the
recipe treatment in a¤ecting weight, it can only come from 2 and 3:
We can check if 2 is signicant from the equation linking di¤erence in
weight between the recipe treatment and the control group.
Case B: 2 = 0
If there is a signicant di¤erence between the combined and the in-
centive treatment, it will be present only because 3 > 0: This e¤ect may
be enhanced by the biological complementarity. Similarly, the comple-
mentarity e¤ect will only exist if 3 > 0 and because w(0; 1) w(0; 0) = 0:
A3 Relating mechanisms to conceptual framework
1. Impact on food at home of incentive treatment: It is not
obvious that food at home increases in the incentive treatment as the
mother may substitute away food at home when food at Anganwadi
increases due to the worker being incentivized. However, we observe:
f(1; 0)  f(0; 0) > 0 (2)
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This may mean that the mother is getting enough information from
the worker to not decrease her food inputs even if food at Anganwadi
may be increasing.
2. Impact on food at home of recipe treatment: The recipe
book should have either no e¤ect or a positive e¤ect on food at home.
We nd no e¤ect:
f(0; 1)  f(0; 0) = 0 (3)
3. Impact on food at home of combined treatment:
a) No mother-worker interaction: Consider the simple case
where the worker and mother cannot interact with each other. In this
case, the impact of the combined treatment on weight can be greater
than the incentive treatment if and only if there is an e¤ect of the recipe
treatment on weight through food at home.
b) Mother-worker interaction: In the more general case, a worker
can talk to the mother and inuence her feeding to the child. Here, the
combined treatment can be more e¤ective than the incentive treatment
through two channels. First, as before, simply having the recipe book
available to the mother increases food at home. Second, there may be
a complementarity between incentive and information in making the
mother-worker communication more e¤ective.
As the recipe book has no e¤ect on weight but we still observe the
combined treatments e¤ect on food at home to be greater than the
incentive treatment, it would imply presence of a complementarity be-
tween incentive and information in changing food at home through better
communication. In other words, communication channel is enhanced by
combining incentives and information if:
f(1; 1)  f(1; 0) > 0 and (4) holds.
A4 Food expenditure
Table A.1 seems to suggest that food expenditure increased in the in-
centive treatment (as the recipe book was unavailable and food intake
increased) and decreased in the recipe (relative to control) and remained
unchanged in the combined treatment. Mothers in the combined treat-
ment appear to cook from the recipe book to increase the calorie intake
of their children and are monitored in their tasks by the incentivized
worker. The decline in the food expenditure in the recipe treatment
may be due to mothers using general ideas from the recipe book to
lower their food expenditure as they do not appear to use the recipe
book extensively.
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Even though self-reported weekly food expenditure is not as objective
as measuring weight, it gives us clues about how much the mothers are
saving due to preparation of cheaper caloric foods at home. It appears
that the mothers in the combined treatment are able to substitute low-
calorie and highly priced foods with home-made nutritious recipes that
are much more economical.
Table A.1: Food expenditure per week
VARIABLES Food exp Food exp
(1) (2)
Post 83.161*** 60.748***
(18.572) (14.429)
Incentive -31.421 -29.717
(24.746) (25.235)
Recipe -16.927 0.807
(23.918) (23.216)
Combined 72.136** 86.986***
(30.889) (29.984)
Post*Incentive 69.263** 57.007*
(33.429) (31.710)
Post*Recipe -66.776** -54.388**
(27.280) (24.234)
Post*Combined -50.787 -70.169
(54.145) (42.624)
Other controls Yes
Constant 440.026*** 203.878***
(14.035) (49.384)
Observations 7558 6456
R-squared 0.049 0.308
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level.
Food expenditure is measured by asking the mother, “On average, what is the
weekly expenditure on food for the household?” *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A5 Heterogeneity by experience of worker
More experienced workers tend to do much worse on health outcomes
than those who are less experienced in the combined treatment as shown
in Table A.257. The e¤ect may be because of four channels: rst, the ed-
ucational qualications of less experienced workers tend to be better. We
control for the education of the worker under other controls in Column
(2), but this does not make a signicant di¤erence to the result. Second,
the new workers may have more motivation to visit mothers as well as
less resistance to new ideas. We also control for baseline work and life
satisfaction of workers, but this doesnt appear to be signicantly corre-
lated with weight increase. Third, the age similarity between the newer
workers and the mothers (who have an average age of 28 years) may be
leading to better communication. I nd that age gap between worker
57On the contrary, Vermeesch and Kremer (2005) nd that childrens participation
is higher and educational attainment better, when teachers are more experienced.
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and mother indeed has a signicant and negative coe¢ cient, hinting that
mothers and workers may nd it easier to communicate if there is a lower
age gap. Lastly, it could be possible that more experienced workers are
placed in worse Anganwadis or those with more malnourished children.
However, more experienced workers are on average in Anganwadis with
better infrastructure (fan, electricity, drinking water and blackboard)
and there is no correlation between experience of worker and likelihood
of child being malnourished in the baseline (table not shown).
Table A.2: Heterogeneous impact of treatments on weight
depending on experience of worker
VARIABLES Weight Weight
(1) (2)
Post 0.275*** 0.268***
(0.050) (0.053)
Incentive -0.312** -0.224
(0.151) (0.164)
Recipe -0.224 -0.161
(0.143) (0.137)
Combined -0.393* -0.390*
(0.199) (0.206)
Post*Incentive -0.029 0.022
(0.091) (0.092)
Post*Recipe -0.046 0.003
(0.109) (0.111)
Post*Combined 0.397*** 0.439***
(0.110) (0.110)
High experience -0.169 0.039
(0.152) (0.158)
High experience*Incentive 0.414* 0.387*
(0.220) (0.226)
High experience*Recipe 0.306 0.291
(0.208) (0.205)
High experience*Combined 0.166 0.187
(0.258) (0.260)
Post*High experience*Incentive 0.034 0.006
(0.083) (0.083)
Post*High experience*Recipe 0.052 0.010
(0.112) (0.113)
Post*High experience*Combined -0.329** -0.366***
(0.126) (0.125)
Educated Worker 0.110
(0.106)
Very Satisfied with Work -0.063
(0.137)
Very Satisfied with Life 0.100
(0.136)
Age gap -0.014**
(0.005)
Constant 13.360*** 13.273***
(0.107) (0.149)
Observations 7784 6868
R-squared 0.013 0.018
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the Anganwadi level in parentheses.
High experience is a dummy equal to 1 when worker’s experience is greater
than 9 years (median level of experience). Age gap is defined as the difference
in years between age of worker and mother. Educated worker implies
educated till at least till A-levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A6 Kernel estimation
Looking at the kernel estimates for change in weight in treatments and
control, we observe a distinct performance of the combined scheme in
increasing the weights of children relative to the other schemes. The
incentive-only treatment seems to be a distant second and there appears
to be virtually no di¤erence of providing the recipe book on the change
in weight. It is also interesting to note that for intervals of decrease
in weight, the combined treatment seems to perform better than the
incentive or the recipe scheme.
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Figure A.1: Kernel estimation for change in weight by treatment
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Figure A.2: Kernel estimation for change in weight for moderately and
severely malnourished by treatment
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A7 Matching
370 Anganwadis are administered through 3 geographical blocks in Chandi-
garh and are further classied as either rural, urban or slum. Prelim-
inary data was collected in December 09 for 361 Anganwadis when I
conducted a pilot to nalize the details of the experiment. Table A.3
shows the break-up of the Anganwadis by location and block.
Table A.3: No. of Anganwadi centres in Chandigarh by block and location
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total
Rural 18 28 42 88
Urban 25 13 20 58
Slum 77 76 71 224
Total 120 117 133 370
Before matching similar centers from Blocks 2 and 3 to Block 1, I
dropped all centers from my sample that were shared within the same
cluster by two blocks in order to avoid any spill-over e¤ects of di¤erent
treatments. These amounted to 4 centers from Block 1, 9 centers from
Block 2 and 15 centers from Block 3. The sample sizes for treatment
and control groups have been based on power calculations run in Op-
timal Design and the selection of 36 centers each in recipe and control
group has been done through a MATLAB algorithm that matches the
total proportion of malnourished kids in Blocks 2 and 3 to the Block 1
average of 0.5297. Comparison of average proportion of malnourished
kids (under 6 years) in the four groups is given in Table A.4 showing
similarity between the means for di¤erent degrees of malnutrition across
the four groups.
Table A.4: Summary statistics by groups from data collected before
baseline
T1 T2 T3 C
Incentive Book Combined Control
Total centres in slums 38 36 35 36
Block Number 1 3 1 2
Mean proportion of
malnourished
0.5144 0.5295 0.5531 0.5176
Standard deviation 0.1584 0.1310 0.1679 0.0916
Proportion of Grade I 0.3197 0.3224 0.3169 0.3271
Proportion of Grade II 0.1657 0.1796 0.2066 0.1697
Proportion of Grade III 0.0280 0.0269 0.0277 0.0194
Proportion of Grade IV 0.0009 0.0005 0.0019 0.0015
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The summary statistics for combined treatment have been calculated
by excluding 10 centers from Indira Colony as preliminary data was
unavailable for that cluster.
For selecting the adequate sample size, I used the software, Optimal
Design Version 1.77. The number of children per center or n was taken
to be 25. Figure below shows power against intra-class correlation for
di¤erent size e¤ects. For instance, the intra-class correlation needed to
detect a small e¤ect of 0.2 standard deviations at the 5% signicance
level and a power of 0.8 is about 0.05 . If the e¤ect size is slightly larger
at  =0.30, intra-class correlation can be as high as 0.15 and the power
would still be su¢ ciently high.
Figure A.3: Power versus Intra-class correlation
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Figure A.4: Growth Chart used in Anganwadis
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MOTHER’S QUIZ
1. How many times do you feed your child in a day?
1… … … … … .2… … … … … 3… … … … ..4… … … … .5… … … ..
2. How many times should growing children (age 3-6) be fed in a day?
1… … … … … .2… … … … … 3… … … … ..4… … … … ..5… … … ..
3. If there is paleness of complexion, which 3 food items will you give to increase iron?
1. Black gram 2. Carrot 3. Ghee 4. Milk 5. Pulses 6. Spinach
4. Which 3 food items promote better eyesight?
1. Black gram 2. Carrot 3. Ghee 4. Milk 5. Green leafy vegetables
6. Mango
5. Deficiency of protein causes shrivelling of body. Which 3 food items will you give from the
following for increasing protein?
1. Carrot 2. Soya bean 3. Pulses 4. Ghee 5. Milk/Yoghurt 6.
Mango
6. For increasing calorie intake which 3 food items will you give to your child?
1. Rice 2. Jaggery 3. Carrot 4. Soya bean 5. Pulses 6.  Wheat
7. If your child is suffering from diarrhoea, which 3 food items should you give to your child?
1. ORS Water 2. Ghee 3. Lime Water 4. Mango 5. Water mixed with pulses
and rice
8. What symbol is visible on Government’s packet of Iodised salt?
1. Laughing Sun 2. Laughing Flower 3. Laughing Moon 4. Laughing Child 5. Laughing Lion.
9. Which 2 food items are good for strengthening your child’s bones?
1. Carrot 2. Bajra 3. Milk 4. Green leafy vegetables 5. Mango
10. Daliya and Maida (local preparations) both are made from Wheat. Which is more
nutritious?
1. Dalia    2. Maida
Figure A.5: Translation of Mothers quiz
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Table A.5: Testing threshold effects on weight, worker effort and food at home
VARIABLES Weight
Near threshold
Weight
Far threshold
Worker visits
Near threshold
Worker visits
Far threshold
Sweet
Near threshold
Sweet
Far threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.420*** 0.446*** -1.836*** -2.140*** -0.059* -0.099***
(0.079) (0.067) (0.495) (0.599) (0.032) (0.035)
Incentive -0.136 -0.096 -0.631 -1.194* -0.027 -0.072*
(0.147) (0.129) (0.661) (0.712) (0.043) (0.044)
Recipe -0.258* 0.100 -1.940*** -2.192*** 0.056 -0.016
(0.135) (0.151) (0.568) (0.690) (0.037) (0.048)
Combined -0.257 -0.104 -2.586*** -2.800*** -0.078** -0.093*
(0.158) (0.136) (0.612) (0.701) (0.034) (0.047)
Post*Incentive 0.038 -0.021 3.544*** 3.951*** 0.125** 0.237***
(0.105) (0.093) (0.701) (0.805) (0.055) (0.060)
Post*Recipe 0.039 -0.031 2.356*** 2.702*** 0.045 0.070
(0.110) (0.122) (0.602) (0.728) (0.057) (0.052)
Post*Combined 0.205* 0.212 3.734*** 4.183*** 0.289*** 0.353***
(0.108) (0.128) (0.647) (0.756) (0.062) (0.079)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 11.919*** 11.212*** 6.964*** 7.102*** 0.100 0.153
(0.514) (0.674) (1.351) (1.418) (0.086) (0.106)
Observations 2107 1803 2107 1803 2107 1803
R-squared 0.071 0.080 0.135 0.129 0.069 0.105
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the Anganwadi level in parentheses. Worker visits in the past month are reported by mother. Sweet
means intake of traditional sweets is at least twice a week. Near threshold implies that baseline weight of child was less than her target
weight by a maximum of 1.12 kg, which is half of the mean difference between two grades. Other controls include: Age of mother,
Proportion kitchen, Proportion non-kitchen, Household Income, Food expenditure, No. of family members who are children, adult members,
and the following dummy variables: Mother housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking
water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median
experience), Educated worker (at least till A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen
means proportion of kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker. Non-kitchen
assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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